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Abstract 
This paper shows how credit quality transition matrices of loans to Italian 
firms changed during a cyclical downturn (2008-09), compared with a previous time 
of growth (2006-07). Once transition matrices were linked to interest rates, banks ap-
pear to have been remarkably able at calibrating required risk premiums to actual 
idiosyncratic risk, both during expansion and recession. However, the uncertainty 
generated by the crisis accentuated the unexpected component of credit worsening, 
thus lowering pricing effectiveness. The main finding is that larger banking groups 
were more affected by the sudden deterioration of credit quality than smaller ones, as 
far as ability to price risk is concerned. The bank-size effect can be tackled through an 
efficient use of hard or soft information: both rating users and decentralized banks 
showed an above-average ability in calibrating rates to risk during the crisis; banks 
with a stronger relationship with borrowers smoothed the risk-price curve in normal 
times. 
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1   Introduction
1 
This paper addresses the question of which banks were more affected by the sudden deterioration 
of credit quality during the crisis, as far as their ability to correctly price risk is concerned. In or-
der to answer this question, I apply to the Italian credit market a tool drawn from credit risk analy-
sis, the transition matrix, and use the recent crisis as a natural experiment to gauge pricing effec-
tiveness. The steps are as follows. 
For the first time, credit quality transition matrices for bank loans to Italian firms are computed; 
they are referred to two distinct periods, namely a ‘before the crisis’ (2006-07) and a ‘crisis’ pe-
riod (2008-09). 
Second, the paper employs well-established risk pricing models, stating that (bank) interest rates 
should incorporate a risk premium, or spread, based upon the transition matrix estimated ex ante 
by the price setter (Jarrow et al, 1997). 
Finally, the focus is on the correspondence between the realised transitions and the rates charged 
by banks to firms. A weaker correspondence signals that the actual riskiness of debtors has been 
assessed ex ante with lower accuracy. We can therefore detect for which banks the credit deterio-
ration had a larger unexpected component by looking at modifications in the link between interest 
rates and transitions, before and after the crisis.  
The main finding of the paper is that the discriminatory power of spreads was unambiguously 
weakened by the crisis, with significant divergence among banks of different type. The unex-
pected component of the credit worsening entailed a decline of the risk-related spread, compared 
with that applied before the crisis; the decline was larger for top five banking groups than for 
other banks. Looking beyond the mere size effect, the slower reaction of larger banks to the tur-
moil was probably rooted into organisational complexity, hampering an efficient use of informa-
tion, of both hard and soft nature. Banks which resorted to formal rating systems benefited from a 
systematic use of hard information. Highly decentralised banks also display stronger capability to 
calibrate rates to risk in a downturn, thanks to their aptitude to collect non-codified information 
about firms. Banks with a stronger relationship to borrowers (their main banks) build a steeper 
risk-adjusted curve in normal times, but make it milder than other banks in hard times. 
                                                 
1 The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. The 
author would like to thank Giorgio Albareto, Paolo Angelini, Marcello Bofondi, Luisa Carpinelli, Giovanni Ferri, Ni-
kola Tarashev and an anonymous referee for insightful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.   6
Other contributions are the following. ‘Expansion’ and ‘recession matrices’ are clearly different, 
and this finding provides us with a concrete measure of the increase in uncertainty faced by banks. 
I further document that banks have been able to calibrate interest rates to the actual riskiness of 
Italian obligors, based upon their location within the matrix. This finding holds true during the 
crisis, in spite of greater uncertainty. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the debate on transition matrices and on 
pricing effectiveness of different banks. Section 3 elaborates matrices for bank loans to Italian 
firms based on an extensive set of individual data and comments on modifications intervened with 
the crisis. Section 4 deals with the pricing of loans feeding the matrix, while section 5 performs a 
descriptive and an econometric analysis of spreads with a view to isolating the unexpected com-
ponent of the realised credit portfolio deterioration. Section 6 concludes. 
2   Background 
Two strands of literature are relevant to the present analysis. First, the crisis is used as a natural 
experiment and its effects are explored on credit quality migrations and on ability of banks in 
foretelling these migrations. Second, the core question deals with the nature of banks which were 
more affected in their capacity to forecast this evolution. 
2.1  The effect of a crisis on credit quality migrations 
Rating systems and matrices of obligors’ transition between ratings are the first building block of 
credit risk models (Lowe, 2002). The transition matrix characterises the frequency or probability 
with which debtors within a portfolio shift across different credit qualities over a given time hori-
zon.
2 
Several studies have shown that these probabilities can be affected by the current regime of the 
economy or by cross-section factors, such as the size, sector or location of the obligors (Altman 
and Kao, 1992a, 1992b, Altman, 1998, Nickell et al, 2000, Bangia et al, 2002, Lando and Skode-
berg, 2002). In particular, the impact of the business cycle suggests hypothesizing time non-
homogeneity, therefore distinguishing between “expansion matrices” and “recession matrices”. 
The correct estimation of these conditional matrices is relevant, and can modify the assessment of 
                                                 
2 From a theoretical point of view, it is usually assumed the evolution in the credit situation to be governed by a Markov 
process. Let x(t) be the state vector, defined as a row-vector which characterise the probability distribution of the qual-
ity of credit (e.g. extended to a given company) at time t; then the Markov process governing the evolution of the state 
vector is such that x(k+1) = x(k)P, where P is the transition matrix which defines the passage of the state vector from a 
period to the subsequent.   7
the amount of capital that financial institutions should post against their credit risk (Jafry and 
Schuermann, 2004, Panetta et al, 2009a). Allowing for conditional migration frequencies leads to 
a measure of the increase in uncertainty, driven by an upsurge in unexpected losses for banks dur-
ing a recession: to tackle higher unexpected losses, a larger capital buffer is required (Valencia, 
2010). Recognising the cyclical nature of uncertainty facing banks, in turn, helps explaining lev-
erage cycles in the banking sector, where assets-to-capital ratios change in connection with eco-
nomic phases (Estrella, 2004). Time-dependent patterns in matrices are at the roots of procyclical-
ity of the credit assessment systems, and might reflect real and financial imbalances which natu-
rally build up in expansions, sowing the seeds of future contractions (Borio et al, 2001). 
Bangia et al, 2002, estimate how much the required economic capital is altered on the grounds of 
the cycle-corrected transition frequencies. Estimates of the Value at Risk (VaR) of a credit portfo-
lio can change in a nontrivial way (25 to 30 per cent) if the matrix is computed under time 
non-homogeneity. Kashyap and Stein, 2004, show that capital requirements referred to a portfolio 
of credits can change following the cycle, the size of these changes depending on the method used 
to assess credit risk. Some credit risk assessment models explicitly assume that both transition 
probabilities and their correlations evolve over time (Nickell et al, 2000, Otani et al, 2009). 
For banks, the importance of a correct estimation of credit migration matrices also stems from the 
fact that interest rates should be consistent with the estimated transitions of debtors, according to 
risk pricing models (Jarrow et al, 1997).  
Although beyond the reach of this paper, there are general reasons to explore the changing link 
between interest rates and transition matrices. The link allows to compare two hypotheses about 
the nature of credit and economic cycles: according to a predictability view, cycle would follow a 
partly predictable pattern, and the credit risk measure within interest rates would therefore grow 
before recessions; on the other hand, a random walk view maintains the irregular component of 
the cycle is predominant, making prediction difficult, and therefore measured risk would basically 
reflect current economic conditions (Pederzoli and Torricelli, 2005, Kwark, 2002, Gertler et al, 
1991). Moreover, the spread charged to risky customers might be driven by a credit spread puzzle 
(Amato and Remolona, 2003; Cremers et al, 2005, Collin-Dufresne et al, 2010): spreads are usu-
ally found to be high with respect to historical default rates. The puzzle suggests that rates incor-
porate an insurance premium against jump-to-default risk, the risk that the quality of underlying 
debt experiences sudden systematic evolutions. In positive junctures banks would apply a spread   8
including this insurance premium; as jump-risk realizes, i.e. in economic downturns, interest rates 
appear to be low compared with previous (expansion) spreads. 
2.2 The pricing effectiveness of different banks 
A specific research interest, of microeconomic nature, is the core question of this paper. It ad-
dresses the characteristics of the banks for which the link between rates and actual debtors’ riski-
ness has been blurred to a greater extent, owing to the crisis. I will investigate this issue having 
regard to two dimensions: the bank size and the use of different types of information (hard and 
soft information).  
The first feature which could influence banks’ ability to correctly price risk is size. On one hand, 
the portfolio of a small bank features a higher correlation in defaults, as is less diversified at a 
geographical, industry and firm-size level. Correlation tends to further grow during a sudden cy-
clical downturn (Andersen et al, 2000) and this might put at a disadvantage limited portfolios, 
with high idiosyncratic and local contagion risk (Giesecke and Weber, 2004). 
On the other hand, the advantage of large portfolios shrinks and in the end evaporates when corre-
lations between defaults rise to a significant degree (Amato and Remolona, 2005). Risk manage-
ment systems tend to under-rate both the increase in correlations, and the credit portfolio size 
which is needed to effectively diversify risk away. At times of a severe regime change, credit 
pricing in outsized portfolios might result ex post more inefficient, as it relied on lower-than-
realised default correlations. Hence, the surprise effect measured from rates would be larger for 
larger banks. Furthermore, larger banks which in recent years extended their business might suffer 
the winner’s curse of entrants into new markets, which lowers their pricing effectiveness (Shaffer, 
1997, Bofondi and Gobbi, 2004, Gobbi and Lotti, 2004, Hauswald and Marquez, 2006).  
Recent research has shown that, beyond bank size, organisational arrangements or adoption of 
lending technologies could affect the credit process (see Albareto et al, 2008 for a comprehensive 
survey). Pricing effectiveness of larger banks in times of turmoil could benefit from a more effi-
cient use of hard information (Panetta et al, 2009b) or instead be weakened by organisational fea-
tures, e.g. the greater distance between decision hubs and local customers.  
It is worth trying to look into the “black box” of the bank size, in order to disentangle the specific 
contribution of such factors to price effectiveness. First, the effects of the adoption of rating sys-
tems on the cost of credit are ambiguous (Berger et al, 2002). The use of quantitative methods   9
could allow banks to broaden credit availability to risky businesses (marginal borrowers). The 
overall portfolio riskiness would not necessarily rise, however, if idiosyncratic risk of single debt-
ors is identified with higher accuracy. Neither a clear-cut hypothesis is possible with respect to 
average rates. Rates could end up being unable to account for ex post losses, e.g. if the bank 
mainly uses ratings to grant credit, rather than to price it. In general, strong reliance on hard in-
formation, which is necessarily lagged (e.g. for balance-sheet data), and lower reliance on soft in-
formation might jeopardize timely identification of credit cycle changes (Berger et al, 2005).  
Against this background, organisational arrangements might provide incentives to the bank struc-
ture for collecting relevant information. In particular, broader delegation to loan officers would 
foster their willingness to gather and process non-transmittable soft information, which in turn 
might affect the effectiveness of credit pricing (Stein, 2002). 
Finally, the intensity of bank-borrower relationship is also relevant, in that it allows for informa-
tion accumulation, and hence more accurate pricing. At the same time, stronger relationships also 
give room for strategic pricing from the part of the bank: relying on a strong and long-lasting rela-
tionship, a bank might find convenient to smooth interest rates with respect to the (change of) bor-
rower’s riskiness (Machauer and Weber, 1998, Petersen and Rajan, 1995). This could lead to 
weaker correspondence between rates and riskiness, especially in turmoil. 
Pricing accuracy might also have a geographical dimension. Recent entry of banks into highly 
contestable markets amplifies the mobility of market shares in some areas. This again might lead 
to Shaffer’s, 1997, winner’s curse, which materialize for banks expanding their market shares, and 
granting credit to (sub)marginal borrowers when entering new, contestable markets. 
3   Step 1: Transition matrices of bank loans to Italian firms 
The crisis which set off in 2007 and intensified in 2008 resulted in a deterioration of credit quality 
for Italian banks, which was not homogeneous across banking groups of different dimensions (Ta-
ble a1). 
In order to thoroughly appreciate the path of deterioration of bank loans to Italian firms, firm-
level data in the Italian Credit Register database (Centrale dei Rischi, CR) allow filling a matrix 
of the frequencies with which bank loans shift through different states of impairment. The sample 
covers all the bank-firm relationships in the database, about 3 million observations. The frequen-
cies are based on conditional transition matrices, i.e. referred to two biennial periods, 2006-07   10
and 2008-09 (Bangia et al, 2002). The adopted method implements a cohort approach, the most 




Transition matrix between situations of impairment for loans to Italian firms (1) 
(period 31 December 2007 – 2009 and 2005 – 2007; percentage frequencies)  
State of the loan at the final date of the reference period    State of the loan 
at the initial date 
of the reference 
period 
Fully 







forming  Loss  N. loans 
(000) 
           
  a. “Recession” matrix (December 2007  December 2009) 
Fully regular  79.5  14.2 1.4 1.2 2.1  1.4  0.2  962.4 
Overdraft  43.1  35.3 3.4 3.3 8.0  6.0  0.9  267.4 
Past-due <180 dd  32.7 25.0  5.8  6.8 16.0  12.4 1.4 20.5 
Past-due >180 dd  30.1  19.7  4.2 10.9 19.5  14.2 1.3 19.6 
Sub standard  7.4 6.5 1.2  1.6 41.3  37.5 4.4 24.6 
Non- performing  0.1      0.1 94.7  5.1  256.0 
Loss        10.4 89.6  82.1 
  b. “Expansion” matrix (December 2005  December 2007) 
Fully  regular  81.1  15.1 1.1 1.0 0.8  0.8  0.1  847.4 
Overdraft  47.0  38.5 2.9 2.9 3.8  4.0  0.8  249.6 
Past-due <180 dd  35.5  31.5  5.6  7.7  8.7  9.3  1.6  20.8 
Past-due  >180  dd 30.6 25.2  4.7 12.3 12.4  12.6 2.2 24.9 
Sub  standard  8.1 7.9 1.2 1.7  31.6 41.0  8.4  22.6 
Non-  performing        88.1  11.8  271.9 
Loss        1.0  99.0  74.7 
Source: Central Credit Register. See methodological appendix. 
(1) Entries in the matrix represent the percentage frequencies at which bank-firm relationships, recorded in the state shown in the first column at the 
start of the reference period, moved towards the situation shown in the subsequent columns at the end of the following 24 months. Frequencies are 
reported as percentage of the number of the bank-firm relationships in the sample belonging to the relevant initial state; they sum up to 1 by row. Val-
ues below 0,1 are not reported. Entries In bold for 2007-09 matrix are statistically different from the corresponding entry in the 2005-07 matrix (at 1 per 
cent confidence level). To perform these tests, I calculate t-statistics equal to the difference between corresponding entries in the first sample (2007 to 
2009) and the second sample (2005 to 2007) transition probabilities divided by standard errors for the first sample estimate. The calculation is there-
fore conditional on the first sample probabilities. Standard errors are calculated under the simplifying assumption that rating transitions are temporally 
and cross-sectionally independent (Nickell et al, 2000). 
Table 1 presents transition matrix for bank loans to Italian firms.
4 The distinction between expan-
sion and recession matrices seems to emerge unambiguously. In fact, the bold figures in the 
2008-09 matrix highlight entries which are statistically different from corresponding entries in 
2006-07 matrix (at 1 per cent level).
5 While frequencies in these matrices refer to number of bank-
                                                 
3 Lando and Skodeberg, 2002. The cohort approach is flawed by statistical limitations, in that it usually takes into ac-
count the debtors’ situation at the start and the end of period, disregarding transitions to other states during the period; 
moreover, statistical issues such as (right) censoring and (left) truncation are overlooked. This entails a misalignment in 
transition estimates compared to sounder statistical methods, based upon survival analysis (e.g. duration or hazard rate 
approach). However, misalignment among different methods does not seem to be systematic, since within the same 
portfolio over- and under-estimations can simultaneously be found for different classes, without monotonic pattern. Cy-
clical phases are not the only determinant of transition matrices. Transition matrices can be separately estimated for dif-
ferent firm sizes, industries or location (see fig. a2 to a5 for matrices based on subsamples of firms). Nickell et al, 2000 
fits an ordered probit model, finding that business cycle is the most important factor to be accounted for. 
4  Matrix frequencies should in principle be monotonically decreasing moving away from diagonal. Violations of 
monotonicity are however often found, and might depend, apart from noise in employed data, on the effect of infra-
period transitions within the relevant horizon, i.e. over a shorter period than the reference horizon for the estimation of 
the final transition (Bangia et al, 2002). 
5 This matrix translates what is generally understood to be the firms’ rating (its probability of default, PD) into credit 
quality as defined according to CR paradigm. Future research would usefully compare the average rating of firms be-
longing to different matrix cells, in order to check for correspondence between alternative definitions of credit quality.   11
firm relationships, matrices referred to amount of bank credit exhibit very similar patterns (Ta-
ble a6).
6 
Matrices can be compared through summary indicators (see Appendix 1). A mobility index docu-
ments the speed of changes in credit quality, whereas a deterioration index shows how much of 
this mobility is due to credit worsening. Fig. 1, panel a, shows that credit quality mobility in-
creased by about 12 per cent; this figure provides us with a quantitative estimate of the degree of 
uncertainty facing the traditional banking business as a consequence of the crisis inception. At the 
same time, deterioration switched from -6.0 to -7.4 per cent. 
Figure 1 
Mobility, deterioration and distance in expansion and recession matrices 
(indicator values) 
a) Mobility and deterioration in credit quality (1)  b) Distance between “expansion” and  


































Italy Small firms Other North West Noth East Center South
Source: Central Credit Register. See the methodological appendix. 
(1) The x-axis is a mobility index. The y-axis is a credit quality deterioration/improvement index, which ranges from +1 (maximum improvement) to -1 
(maximum deterioration). See the methodological appendix. – (2) Euclidean distance L
2 between two matrices Pa and Pb is the square of the sum of 
the quadratic differences between each entry in matrix Pa and the corresponding entry in Pb, divided by N
2 (Jafry and Schuermann, 2004). 
It is possible to account for changes in non-diagonal entries through distance metrics. Figure 1, 
panel b, displays distance metrics between recession and expansion matrices. The distance is 
found to range from 2.5 to 6, depending on the specific matrix. Transitions are more affected by 
business cycles for small firms, which hence, according to this evidence, seem to have been hit by 
the downturn in a stronger way (Hancock and Wilcox, 1998). The matrices are also quite different 
across country areas, with major changes for Centre-Southern companies. In these regions credit 
growth has been stronger during the crisis, and the overall impact of the crisis has been partly di-
luted only by the larger share of (public) service sector (Banca d’Italia, 2009). 
                                                 
6 A main departure of credit amount-based matrices from headcount-based matrices refers to transitions from/to over-
draft. This is due to the relative diffusion of minor overdraft situations, and to the stricter definition of overdraft loans 
used in amount-based matrices. See the methodological appendix.   12
The rapid worsening of loans portfolio did not affect all banks to the same extent (Figure a1). 
Banks belonging to the top five groups experienced an above-the-average jump in credit mobility. 
The effect of using formal rating or scoring systems is ambiguous:
7 portfolios of banks using rat-
ings to assess small business creditworthiness experienced a minor spike in uncertainty, whereas 
this does not hold true for the use of ratings for non-small and medium enterprises (non-SMEs). 
Finally, the systematic use of qualitative information in credit decisions helps taming swings at 
downturns, and strong reliance on collateral tends to magnify it. 
4   Step 2: Effective loan pricing by banks 
According to credit risk models, credit pricing should mirror the expected transition matrix. Banks 
should calibrate risk premiums charged to customers to the ex ante likelihood that the relationship 
move to a (different) impairment situation.
8 As a consequence, the transition matrix allows gaug-
ing to what extent Italian banks have correctly applied this risk management principle. If riskiness 
has been correctly estimated, interest rates to customers belonging to different entries in transition 
matrices should display a monotonic upward slope on each row. The steeper this curve, the 
stronger will appear the discriminatory capacity of banks at setting rates: in fact, a steeper interest 
rate curve on the ex post matrix suggests that the probabilities of credit worsening estimated ex 
ante (and incorporated in rates) closely mirrored the realised transitions.  
The Bank of Italy’s Taxia survey, which covers a large sample of credits included in the CR data-
base (see Appendix 1), allows looking at correspondence between credit transitions and pricing. 
Table 2 presents average rates charged at the initial reference date (December 2007 and December 
2005, respectively) on customers belonging to the entries of the transition matrix. In other words, 
Table 2 fills ex ante rates into the ex post matrix. 
First, it is noticeable that rates distribution complies – to a large extent – with the implications of 
the risk models on correct credit pricing process. In particular, the first row of the matrix, con-
cerning loans fully regular at the starting date, displays a clear upward slope in connection with 
the outcome of the credit relationship in a two-year time. For instance, in December 2007 fully 
regular loans to companies which would have stayed regular in the subsequent 24 months paid an 
                                                 
7 The Bank of Italy carried out a survey at a very large sample of Italian banks, asking questions about organisational 
features of the bank, like use of credit rating / scoring systems, importance of qualitative information or collateral in 
extending credit, etc. The survey was carried out in two waves, in 2007 and 2010. For details, see Albareto et al, 2008. 
8 Crouhy et al, 2000. According to Jarrow et al, 1997, risk premia should be proportional to the probability that corpo-
rate credit evolves towards the worst state (the “absorption” state), starting from the situation at reference date.   13
average 7.11 per cent. At the same time, fully regular loans set to deteriorate to substandard paid 
8.37 per cent, those heading to non perform paid 9.01, and future losses paid 9.11 (with a spread 
of 126bp, 190bp and 200bp in the order). The same pattern can be observed on end-2005 rates.  
 
Table 2 
Interest rates to firms, according to transition of firms between situations of (non)impairment (1) 
(period 31 December 2007 – 2009 and  31 December 2005 – 2007; percentage rates)  
State of the loan at the final date of the reference period  State of the loan at the 
initial date of the refer-
ence period 
Fully 







forming  Loss 
        
  a. Interest rates referred to “Recession” matrix (December 2007  December 2009) 
Fully  regular  7.11 7.69 7.52 7.76 8.37 9.01 9.11 
Overdraft  7.81 8.03 8.48 8.55 9.12 9.89  10.25 
Past-due  <180  dd  8.19 8.44 8.66 8.38 9.45 9.98  10.82 
Past-due  >180  dd  7.73 8.53 8.49 7.54 9.20 9.64  11.08 
Sub  standard  9.27 10.47 10.25  9.86  9.20 10.20 10.17 
Non-  performing       5.97  12.17  12.70 
Loss        13.65  13.65 
  b. Interest rates referred to “Expansion” matrix (December 2005  December 2007) 
Fully  regular  5.95 6.59 6.42 6.59 7.92 8.08 8.61 
Overdraft  6.91 7.19 7.43 7.52 7.73 9.41 9.33 
Past-due  <180  dd  6.66 8.24 7.74 7.38 8.61  10.23  10.21 
Past-due  >180  dd  7.14 7.36 6.91 7.30 8.54  10.25 9.90 
Sub  standard  7.49 8.43 6.09 8.49 8.54 9.64 9.68 
Non-  performing  8.80 16.20      12.88 12.95 11.06 
Loss       5.99  5.37  
Source: Central Credit Register. See methodological appendix. 
(1) Entries in the matrix represent the average interest rates on short-term credit, charged by banks at the start of the relevant reference period to Ital-
ian firms that, from the state shown in the first column at the beginning of the reference period, would have moved towards the situation shown in the 
subsequent columns at the end of the following 24 months. 
For loans which had already deteriorated before the start of the reference period the curve does 
not always display a clear positive slope (Figure a2). This confirms that where probabilities of de-
fault and correlations are higher, estimating parameters for an appropriate assessment of credit 
risk is subject to higher uncertainty (Tarashev, 2009). 
Table 2 shows the ability of banks in discriminating among obligors with different perspective 
riskiness, in spite of a similar initial situation, thus confirming the banks’ forward-looking ap-
proach (Magri and Pico, 2010). However, it is interesting to see to what extent this capacity was 
modified by the recent economic downturn. Figure 2 compares end-2005 to end-2007 curve of 
spreads, and suggests that banks have been actually surprised by the rapid deterioration of finan-
cial situation of firms. Smaller spreads in each row for end-2007 rates (i.e. a flatter risk-adjusted 
curve) epitomize the surprise effect triggered by a crisis whose progress has been largely unfore-
seen, both in intensity and speed.
9 The discriminatory power of the banks has been reduced not 
                                                 
9 The actual unexpected component could be deemed even larger, taking into account the higher general level of rates at 
end 2007 with respect to end 2005. Moreover, the unanticipated component due to recorded deteriorations or unex-  14
only with respect to loans which were fully regular at the start of the reference period, but also for 
those which were already impaired at the moment of their pricing (Figure a2).  
Figure 2 



















Spread before crisis (end 2005) Spread at crisis onset (end 2007)
 
Source: Central Credit Register. See methodological appendix. 
(1) Spread between (a) average interest rates charged at the end of reference year to firms which would have shifted from 
“fully regular” situation to the state shown on the x-axis within the subsequent 24 months, and (b) average interest rate to 
firms which would have stayed in the “fully regular” situation over the same period. The blue and red curves are graphical 
proxies. 
5   Step 3: Different banks and the unexpected component of the crisis 
5.1 Measuring unexpected credit worsening through spreads: a descriptive analysis 
The lower spread charged to risky customers at end 2007 as compared with end 2005 suggests 
that banks had correctly anticipated the deterioration of only a part of these loans, possibly as a 
consequence of an increase in information asymmetry between lenders and borrows (Dell’Ariccia 
and Marquez, 2004). By comparing rates to debtors in the different cells of the matrix we can 
quantify the surprise effect which hit banks at the onset of crisis.  
Spread at end 2007 for risky customers can be decomposed into a benchmark spread and an unex-
pected component, related to the crisis, according to a straightforward methodology (see Appen-
dix 1). In the decomposition end-2005 spread is assumed as a benchmark or normal-times price 
gap that banks require to marginal borrowers. The reduction in spreads in the crisis period, i.e. the 
vertical distance between curves in Figure 2, gauges the unexpected component of the cyclical de-
terioration: risky obligors are assumed to pay, at end 2007, a spread below the 2005 benchmark if 
banks failed, more than usual, to spot loans set to worsen in the subsequent two years. The lower 
                                                                                                                                                  
pected losses on credits could be under-estimated in light of the tendency to under-report losses which is sometimes 
found in phases of banking system fragility (Stever and Wilcox, 2007).    15
the absolute value of the unexpected component, the more stable the ability of banks to locate 
credit risk. 
The result of this decomposition is shown in Figure 3. The unexpected component of credit qual-
ity deterioration (the darker bar in the charts) was not homogeneous if one pays attention at dif-
ferent types of banks (or firms). Different findings for subsamples of loans are important. Sub-
samples that experienced the largest unexpected worsening might have suffered a flight-to-safety 
from banks: i.e., where we find larger surprises, we could expect a more severe subsequent tight-
ening from the part of banks, during the credit crunch period.  
Figure 3 
Unexpected component in interest rates during crisis, by size of bank (1) 
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Other Top 5 banking groups
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(spread before crisis, 2005-07)
(b) Unexpected component (c) Crisis spread (= (a) - (b), 2007-09 )
 
Source: Central Credit Register. See methodological appendix. 
(1) The benchmark component is the spread, recorded at end 2005, between (a) average rates required to “fully regular” obli-
gors which would have turned substandard or non-performing within the following 24 months, and (b) average rates required to 
“fully regular” obligors which would have stayed regular within the following 24 months. The Crisis spread is the same spread 
computed at end 2007. The unexpected component is the difference between the two spreads. 
Unexpected component was unambiguously larger for banks belonging to top five Italian groups 
(Figure 3). Overall, spreads applied to future substandard loans shrank by 1.3 per cent during the 
crisis, compared with the pre-crisis period (-0.6 per cent for smaller banks). For non performing 
loans, the predictive power of rates was reduced by 0.9 per cent for big groups (-0.3 for smaller 
banks). The difference is especially striking for credit lines set to produce substandard loans at 
smaller firms, i.e. where the size asymmetry is larger between large banking groups and custom-
ers. This seems to corroborate the hypothesis pointing to a worse impact of economic downturn 
on large and fast growing portfolios, and on more complex institutions.   16
5.2 Econometric analysis 
5.2.1 The model 
The main aim of the econometric analysis is to disentangle bank categories for which risk-spreads 
were more affected by the crisis in their capacity to spot the actual riskiness of loans, i.e. their 
possible transition to different impairment states. The baseline equation is: 
 
[ ] [ ]) * * , * * , , , , ( , , , , , , , , Crisis Z Tr Crisis X Tr Crisis Z X Tr f s i t b i b t b i i b t b i t b i =     [1] 
 
In [1], the dependent variable, si,b,t is the rate applied by bank b to firm i at time t (t assumes two 
values, the crisis and the period before the crisis). The rate is expressed as a spread with respect to 
the average rate applied to non-impaired debtors that would maintain the situation at the end of 
the relevant period. Tri,b,t are dummies for each possible transition between states of impairment 
for debtor i towards bank b in period t to t+24 months (the benchmark case being for debtors be-
ing regular at both the start and at the end of the relevant period). Xb and Zi are controls for bank 
and firm features, in the order. Some of these features are interacted with both the transition and 
the crisis dummies, between brackets in [1]. These interactions are a major focus of the analysis, 
in order to detect crisis-related changes in the relationship between ex post transitions and ex ante 
rates, i.e. to detect a possible weakening in the correct risk-price association. The bank features 
which are controlled for are size and proxies for the aptitude of banks to gather and employ hard 
or soft information. The firm features are size, industrial and institutional sector, the incorporation 
technique (e.g. limited company), the regional location, the length of the firm’s credit history, the 
availability of some form of collateral and the initial situation of the credit line. Tables a7-a12 re-
port the results for different specifications based on the general form of the [1].  
5.2.2 Pricing effectiveness and the crisis 
In Table a7 the basic relationship is first estimated separately for the period before and after the 
crisis, using the turmoil as a natural experiment to appraise pricing effectiveness at banks. The fit 
of the regressions shows that the banks (i) do comply with the pricing rules suggested by the theo-
retical credit risk models, and (ii) are able to foresee the future evolution of the quality of debtors. 
Without imposing any restriction on estimation, it is noticeable that the coefficients of the transi-  17
tion dummies follow a regular pattern, namely an upward slope across the matrix rows, often with 
non overlapping confidence intervals (Figure 4). Statistical tests (not reported) establish that coef-
ficients in the first row are different (larger) from the previous cell coefficients, at 1 per cent level. 
In other words, econometric estimates unambiguously confirm the hypothesis of the credit risk 
models. Credits which are already in a non-regular situation at the moment of the pricing also 
command a premium, regardless of their final destination: coefficients for the initial credit situa-
tions are positive and increasing. This is the effect of greater uncertainty surrounding unstable 
situations, which is also reflected in less significant coefficients in lower rows of the matrices (Ta-
rashev, 2009). Finally, spreads are decreasing in firm size and if the credit line is assisted by col-
lateral. 
The previous remarks hold both before and during the crisis, confirming that banks largely main-
tained their pricing ability during the turmoil as well. However, some differences are remarkable. 
First, during the crisis the fit of the estimation decreases, pointing to a weaker explanatory power 
of the credit transitions with respect to the interest rate applied. Second, the slope of the coeffi-
cient for worse transitions is milder during the crisis, again suggesting that banks were less sharp 
at calibrating rates to actual debtors’ riskiness. 
Figure 4 
Estimated risk related interest rates spread, before and after the crisis (1) 






























































































































































































































































































































































Source: Central Credit Register. See methodological appendix. 
(1) Estimated coefficients for transition of credits from regular to impaired situations. Each coefficient gauges the spread of 
regular credits shifted to impaired situations, with respect to the average rate applied to credit lines which were regular at 
both the beginning and the end of the relevant period. Estimation periods are end 2005 to end 2007 (before the crisis), end 
2007 to end 2009 (crisis). Vertical lines denote 5 per cent confidence intervals for estimated parameters.   18
5.2.3 Major banks versus other banks 
Regression in Table a8 basically estimates the [1], the pivotal specification of this exercise, based 
on the whole sample. A dummy variable singles out banks belonging to top five banking groups, 
and is interacted with the crisis indicator. The pricing accuracy of banks was reduced by the crisis 
across the board (with an average risk spread reduction of -13 basis points). However, the accu-
racy of larger banking groups was lessened by far more: the interaction between the dummy for 
top five banking groups and the crisis has a coefficient of about -66 basis points, suggesting that 
bigger banks experienced a large additional decrease in pricing accuracy. Noticeably, the risk-
related spread charged by major groups is apparently higher across the whole period (the top five 
groups coefficient, without interaction with the crisis, is positive). In my view, this further con-
firms that major banks were unable to foretell the upcoming downturn, although their prices are 
more selective in non-crisis times. 
With the aim to shed light on the determinants of the larger unexpected component of credit dete-
rioration for some banks, beyond bank group size, I will now try to disentangle the effect of the 
aptitude of banks to gather and employ information, of both hard and soft nature. In order to do 
so, additional regressions consider credit transitions interacted with a set of variables proxying 
bank features which could affect ability in pricing risk, namely (i) the use of rating models, (ii) the 
span of delegation allowed to loan officer, and (iii) the intensity of the bank-firm relationship. The 
following sections comment the results of these specifications (Table a9). 
5.2.4 Gathering and using information: the adoption of rating models by banks 
In the first column in Table a9 a dummy identifies banks which had already implemented quanti-
tative rating models in 2007, i.e. before the crisis. The information is retrieved from the Bank of 
Italy survey on a large sample of banks (see Appendix 1). The estimates suggest that rating-users 
do not show superior ability to price-discriminate for risk, in normal times. However, in crisis 
times, banks using rating models show a lower decrease in the slope of their risk-adjusted interest 
rate curve (the coefficient of the interaction for use of ratings and crisis is positive). 
Albareto et al, 2008, find that some banks do not use rating models for pricing, but mainly for 
screening or monitoring borrowers. Therefore, Table a9, column 2, looks at banks which state that 
their rating models are ‘important’ or ‘fundamental’ (also) in credit pricing. These banks do not 
display superior pricing effectiveness in normal times, but are less affected by the crisis surprise   19
than other banks. These findings apparently suggest that the crisis did not completely blur the in-
formational improvements stemming from a more intense usage of hard information (see Panetta 
et al, 2009b). 
5.2.5 Gathering and using information: the delegation to loan officers 
Organisational diseconomies of scale can be tackled by banks through the span of autonomy al-
lowed to managers directly involved in the relationship with customers (Benvenuti et al, 2010). 
The Bank of Italy survey allows gauging this delegation breadth, through an indicator of relative 
manager’s autonomy, i.e. the ratio between (a) the maximum amount of credit a loan officer can 
grant and (b) the maximum amount the bank’s CEO can grant. In column 3 of Table a9, a dummy 
variable is equal to 1 if the scope of delegated powers at the lending bank – measured as above – 
is above the median value of the sample. 
The results suggest that the span of delegation in normal times does not improve effective pricing 
of credit. However, when a crisis impends, highly decentralised banks seem to be less surprised 
by upcoming deterioration of their loans, as their risk-adjusted interest rate curve stays more up-
ward-sloping. The finding strengthens the relevance of the soft information argument, since more 
empowered loan officers should be, in principle, more prone to gather non-codified information. 
5.2.6 Gathering and using information: the intensity of bank-borrower relationship 
The last column in Table a9 takes into account the strength of the bank-borrower relationship, 
through the prominent role of a bank among the lenders. The “main bank” dummy takes value 1 
where the bank extends the largest (or single) loan to the borrower, according to the dataset. The 
main bank benefits from a stronger relationship to the firm, and in principle is in a better position 
to acquire (soft) information about the intrinsic value of the entrepreneurial project. This would 
enhance ability to calibrate rates to the actual riskiness, also in turmoil. However, often a stronger 
relationship means a longer one, which could lead to interest rate smoothing along the life of the 
relationship, thus softening the reaction of rates to a changing credit situation of the borrower. 
The results of the estimations shed light on these contrasting views. The dummy for the main 
bank is negative, which supports the idea that main lenders tend to smooth interest rates across the 
debtor’s riskiness (Machauer and Weber, 1998). Consistently, when faced by a sudden turmoil, 
the decrease in the risk-related slope for main lenders is smaller, implying that the unexpected   20
component of the credit deterioration is mitigated by the superior information provided by a 
stronger role of the bank among the firm’s lenders. 
 
Overall, looking beyond the size effect, the role of both hard and soft information clearly emerges 
during the crisis from the analysis of organisational features and lending technologies (Table 3). 
Ratings helped better calibrate rates to risk, especially if they are explicitly employed in the pric-
ing process. Highly decentralised banks have been more effective at shielding themselves from 
credit quality surprises, possibly thanks to their skills in collecting non-codified information. A 
stronger bank-borrower relationship led to milder risk-related interest rates curve in normal times, 
while making the risk curve steeper in a downturn. The larger unexpected credit deterioration at 
larger groups is confirmed when ability in using information is accounted for. It therefore seems 
to be rooted into organisational complexity, hampering an efficient use of gathered information. 
 
Table 3 
Main results of the econometric analysis 
  Slope of the risk-adjusted interest rate curve (1) 
  In normal times  During the crisis 
    
Larger banking groups  Higher  Lower 
    
Beyond bank size:     
    
- Use of rating models  …  Higher 
- Use of ratings for pricing  …  Higher 
- High delegation (decentralisation)  …  Higher 
- Main bank  Lower  Higher 
    
Source: Econometric analysis. See figures in the appendix. 
(1) Slope of the risk adjusted interest rate curve for the relevant category of bank, with respect to the average bank, accord-
ing to econometric estimates reported in figures in the appendix. Only statistically significant coefficients are reported. 
5.2.7 Additional findings: smaller and larger firms, regional differences 
The results above do not seem to depend on the customer firm type. In Table a10, columns 1 and 
2, the behaviour of interest rates for SMEs and non-SMEs are separately investigated. The pattern 
of the risk-related interest rate curve is appreciably different among firms of different size (Fig-
ure 5). Bank rates for smaller firms (SMEs) feature higher spreads according to their matrix-
related riskiness. Spreads applied to SMEs are also more dispersed around their mean value; this   21
is presumably the effect of greater opaqueness at small firms (Benvenuti et al, 2010). However, 
the surprise effect of the crisis was basically the same for larger and for smaller firms and the ad-
ditional unexpected component of the worsening for the largest banking groups was almost the 
same. 
Table a11 finally looks at the effect of regional location of firms. Basis regional coefficients sug-
gest that, in general, the pricing accuracy of banks is larger in northern regions. At the same time, 
I find that the crisis came as a major surprise mainly in the northern regions: interacting regional 
location with crisis provides negative and significant coefficients for several northern regions. By 
contrast, transitions of central and southern firms to worse credit situations were less of a surprise 
to banks. 
Figure 5 
Estimated risk related spreads for smaller and other firms (1) 





























































































































































































































































































































































Source: Central Credit Register. See methodological appendix. 
(1) Estimated coefficients for transition of credits from regular to impaired situations. Each coefficient gauges the spread of 
regular credits shifted to impaired situations, with respect to the average rate applied to credit lines which were regular at 
both the beginning and the end of the relevant period. Estimation periods are end 2005 to end 2007, end 2007 to end 2009. 
Vertical lines denote 5 per cent confidence intervals for estimated parameters. 
5.2.8 Alternative explanations and robustness checks 
In order to check for the robustness of main findings, some alternative econometric exercises on 
the baseline specification are run (Table a12). 
First, an alternative explanation of the spread reduction during the crisis is investigated. A milder 
curve during the crisis could stem not only from credit quality surprises, but also from other 
sources: during the crisis, some banks could have adopted heavier under-reporting of credit im-
pairment than other banks. In order to check the under-reporting hypothesis, the impairment situa-
tion of each credit relationship has been re-defined according to the worst credit classification of   22
the debtor at the reference date. In other words, each bank-firm relationship is assigned to the 
worst recorded status, regardless of which classification has been reported by the lending bank. 
This procedure should iron out possible under reporting of impairment from the part of some 
banks, at least for borrowers with multiple bank relationships.  
Then, the same regressions were run using as dependent variable interest rates, instead of spreads 
(the dependent variable in the baseline specification are spreads towards the average rate for 
benchmark situation, i.e. the average rate charged to loans fully regular at both the start and the 
end of the period). The estimation was run excluding fixed effects for banks, and allowing for 
clustering of standard errors by firm, wherever a given firm accounts for multiple observations. 
Spreads outside the 5
th and the 95
th percentile were excluded, instead of only those beyond 1
st and 
99
th percentile. Further, some controls were omitted, like guaranteed credits or banks’ institutional 
category, which are present in the baseline specifications, and might overlap with other dimen-
sions of interest. Finally, estimations were run with a set of refinements to the base-line defini-
tions: impairment status was defined having regard to credit amount classified in each impairment 
status, which entails a stricter definition of overdrafts (see methodological appendix), and alterna-
tive reference periods were used, i.e. two 30-month period, June 2008 to December 2010 (crisis), 
vs. December 2005 to June 2008. 
All these extensions, apart from an expected decrease in the overall fitting of the estimation, basi-
cally yield the same results for relevant parameters. 
6   Conclusions 
This paper addresses the question of which banks were more affected by the sudden deterioration 
of credit quality during the crisis, as far as their ability to correctly price risk is concerned. In or-
der to answer this question, it starts from computing the credit quality transition matrices of bank 
loans to Italian firms, for the first time to my knowledge.  
As a preliminary contribution, I document that matrices have changed, in a significant way, be-
tween expansion and recession. Distance metrics provide a concrete yardstick of this increase in 
uncertainty faced by banks in their traditional business, owing to cyclical downturn. Second, 
banks have been remarkably able to calibrate spreads to the realised credit quality, as measured by 
the transition matrix. The discriminatory power of spreads remains unquestionable during the cri-
sis, in spite of greater uncertainty.   23
However, the key result is that the crisis made the risk-related curve of rates applied to firms no-
ticeably flatter, as uncertainty diluted banks’ capacity to detect ex ante risky credit. The unex-
pected component of the credit worsening is sizeable, and depends on the type of bank extending 
credit. Unexpected downturn was more serious for top five Italian groups, suggesting that pricing 
effectiveness of banks is strongly affected by organisational features, e.g. their governance com-
plexity. Interestingly, larger banks are more capable, in general, to tailor ex ante spreads to actual 
riskiness of their debtors. In other words, the blurring of their spread structure was the specific 
outcome of the surprise effect from a rapid unfavourable evolution.  
Looking beyond bank’s size, the more efficient use of hard information (quantitative rating mod-
els) improved the pricing performance during the downturn. The geographical or functional dis-
tance between decision hubs and local customers might have weakened the ability of some banks 
to spot the upcoming credit worsening just before the turmoil, and in fact decentralised banks suf-
fered less of a surprise. The role of bank-borrower relationship is two-faceted: a stronger relation-
ship with their borrowers led reference banks (the main banks) to smooth the interest rates-risk 
relationship in normal times, which also stayed more stable in the downturn. 
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Appendix 1: Data and methodology 
1. Data 
 
Computing the matrices from Italian credit register (CR) data. – Against the background of a conventional 
12-month horizon for transition matrices, a 24-month period captures the specific dynamics of loan worsen-
ing in two stages, that can be labelled as a pre-crisis (or expansion) and a crisis (or recession) situation. 
In the matrix, single, non-negative entries sum up to 1 by row (right stochastic matrix). The diagonal repre-
sents the frequency of keeping the initial state; off-diagonal entries represent the frequency of transition 
from one state to another, with worsening on the right of the diagonal. The basic assumption behind the co-
hort approach is that, for a given sample, the probability of a transition from rating i to j, is a constant pa-
rameter, pij: for a given initial state, transitions to different possible future states follow a constant parame-
ter, temporally independent process. Estimation can then be performed by taking the fraction of occasions 
in the sample on which an obligor starts the year in state i and ends it in j (Nickell et al, 2000). 
At the initial date of each reference period (i.e. end 2005, end 2007) a static pool of loans is defined, which 
are tracked until the end of the relevant period. Transition matrices are computed from the cash credit lines 
from banks to firms recorded in the CR. Loans larger than 75,000 euro are recorded (30,000 euro from 1 
January 2009). All the bank-firm relationships are included with actual credit usage above zero at both (i) 
the start of the reference period (end 2005, end 2007), and (ii) the end of the reference period (end 2007, 
end 2009). The state of the loan is observed at the start/end of period, disregarding the state of the loan at 
intermediate dates within this period. This entails that a certain number of bank-firm relationships are lost 
between the start and the end of each period, and therefore do not enter the matrix computation. A bank-
firm relationship might be cancelled within a 24 month period due to (i) repayment; (ii) amount reduction 
below the CR threshold; (iii) transition to loss and subsequent write-off. With regards to involved credit 
quantities, the weight of the non recorded loans can be estimated at about 18.0% of total initial credit in the 
two 24-month periods. Cancellations due to write-off (i.e. situation (iii) above) could cause under-
estimation of the actual credit worsening. However, this portion should be minor, due to the fact that before 
write-off a credit is usually recorded in the non-performing category, where the average stay is 54 months. 
In the reported matrices, loans classified in categories like “securitised”, “debt restructuring”, “other”, etc, 
have been overlooked, because in these cases it is unclear how to rank the degree of impairment, with re-
spect to other states. 
 
Matrices on the number of positions (bank-firm relationships). – Frequencies are such that fij = nij / ni, i.e. 
the frequency in each cell describing the transition from state i to state j is equal to the number of observa-
tions which displayed this migration at the end of the period, divided by the number of observations in the 
state i at the start of the period. When a credit line is simultaneously classified in different states of impair-
ment, the worst impairment state has been deemed relevant. This approach could affect in particular the 
“overdraft” classification, which refers to specific credit lines, rather than to the overall bank-firm relation-
ship: a given bank-firm relationship is classified as overdraft even if only a minor share of credit belongs to 
this state of impairment. In order to check for these possible distortions, estimations on credit amount-based 
matrices use a finer definition of overdraft credit (see below).  
 
Matrices on the amount of granted and used credit. – Frequencies have also been calculated having regard 
to loan amounts, attaching a size-weighted importance to each position. The total credit used within the 
bank-firm relationship at reference date is assigned to the worst reported state of impairment, provided that 
the amount of credit recorded in the relevant state of impairment is at least 10 per cent of the total used 
credit (30 per cent for overdraft). Frequencies in the table refer to the used credit amount at the initial refer-
ence date of each period. 
 
Matrices on the number of positions vs. credit amounts. – The base-line analysis in the paper refers to ma-
trices calculated on number of positions. Mobility and improvement/deterioration patterns are similar for 
matrices based on numbers of bank-firm relationships and on quantities of credit, suggesting that no rele-
vant differences would emerge from using the latter in the descriptive or econometric analysis. The follow-
ing table reports the mobility index and the improvement/deterioration indexes for the two estimation meth-
ods of the transition matrices: 
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Comparison between mobility and deterioration indexes,  
matrices based on number of bank-firm relationships Vs. based on quantity of credit (1) 
  Matrices based on numbers  Matrices based on quantities 
  2005-2007 2007-2009 2005-2007 2007-2009 
      
Mobility  index  10.5 11.8  9.1 13.0 
Deterioration/improvement  -0.57 -0.63 -0.41 -0.75 
(1) Indexes are calculated collapsing fully regular loans with overdraft loans. See methodological appendix about the 
method to calculate the indexes. 
 
Definition of Absorbing states. – Absorbing states are those credit situations from where an improvement 
should be unfeasible. In a typical transition matrix, this is the default situation. In the CR classification, ab-
sorbing state should be in principle the loss state. (Please note that the non-performing state also entails vir-
tual no reversion, since it is defined as credit “…towards debtors in an insolvency state (although non judi-
cially certified) or in substantially comparable situations”: see Bank of Italy, Annual report). In fact, CR 
data base records some reversions from the loss state, i.e. bank-firm relationships which are recorded as loss 
at t and in a non-loss situation at t+1. These case could emerge due to (i) erroneous classifications of the 
firm situation (at t or t+1); (ii) mergers among banks (e.g. bank a, recording debtor i as loss at t is merged 
into bank b at t+1, and bank b might not record debtor i as loss at t+1, due to previous relationship with the 
same debtor: since at each reference date the worst situation is accounted for, debtor i would mark an “im-
provement from loss” after the merger). The improvements from loss are purely erroneous or fictitious, and 
hence there is no signal from their change between periods. The impact of these unusual transitions is neg-
ligible to the paper’s purpose: (i) they account for about 0.3% of the recorded bank-firm relationships in 
both the relevant periods; (ii) none of these “reverted” situations is used into the econometric estimation. 
 
Survey statistics on interest rates. – Interest rates are retrieved from banks’ survey reports to the Bank of 
Italy, which cover over 200 bank, and a large part of loans to firms (dataset Taxia). Here below is the cov-
erage of the interest rate survey, with respect to the CR data base:  
 
Average coverage of interest rate data on CR-recorded loans (1) 
(percentage values) 
  Period December 2005 – December 2007  Period December 2007 – December 2009 
    
Overall 43.6  43.8 
Top 5 groups  48.2  49.7 
Small-Medium Firms (SMEs)  37.5  37.8 
Other firms  49.1  49.2 
(1) Percentage of bank-firm relationships for which interest rates on short-term bank credit are recorded in Taxia data 
base, at the initial data of the reference period (December 2005, December 2007), with respect to the corresponding num-
ber of bank-firm relationships recorded in the CR data base, and used for the computation of the transition matrix. 
 
Rates are calculated as the weighted average of simple rates, disregarding fees and commissions. Outlier 
rates are excluded (below 1
st and 99
th percentile). In order to compute averages for end-2005 (end-2007) 
rates, debtors are classified according to their transition from end-2005 to end-2007 (from end-2007 to end-
2009). Small businesses, or SMEs, are defined as firms below 20 employed units. 
 
Survey on organisational features. – Organisational and lending technologies variables are retrieved from 
the Bank of Italy survey carried out in early 2007 and early 2010 (Albareto et al, 2008). 
 
2. Mobility, deterioration and distance indexes for matrices 
A mobility index, based upon eigenvalues of a N X N matrix, is Mp(P) = (1/N –  1)*(N – tr(P)), where P is 
the matrix and tr(…) denotes the trace of the matrix (Jafry and Schuermann, 2004; Shorrocks, 1978).
10 
Weighing frequencies on each row with the corresponding marginal frequency amounts to computing mo-
                                                 
10 Mobility indexes basically carry out a subtraction from a transition matrix of an identity, which corresponds to a static 
outcome, where no subject changes its state between the start and the end of the reference period. The subtraction al-
lows to disentangle the exclusively dynamic part of the original matrix, which reflects its dimension in terms of implicit 
mobility.   28
bility index on number of positions, rather than on relative frequencies. With respect to tables in the text, 
mobility indexes account for some transitions which are not displayed (to “restructured loans”), because 
their ranking in terms of degree of deterioration is not univocally defined. Furthermore, slight deteriorations 
(overdraft) are collapsed with fully regular loans into an “almost regular loans” category, since small over-
drafts are rather common in Italian bank-firm relationships. 
 
The deterioration/improvement index ranges from 1 (maximum improvement) to -1 (maximum deteriora-
tion), and is calculated as follows:  
 
(Improvement – Deterioration) / (Improvement + Deterioration + Stability) 
 
where Improvement = Σi>j (nij), Deterioration = Σi<j (nij) and Stability = Σi=j (nij). 
 
Usual distance metrics between two matrices, PA and  PB, are labelled L
1 or L
2. L
1 equates the average abso-
lute difference between corresponding elements of the matrices. The L




1(PA, PB) =  ∑∑|PA,i,j – PB, i,j| 
 
L
2(PA, PB) = √ ( ∑∑(PA,i,j – PB,i,j )
2 ) / N
2 
 
3. Descriptive analysis. Decomposing the spreads in the matrix into a benchmark and an unexpected 
component 
Spread at end 2007 for risky customers can be decomposed into a “benchmark” spread and an unexpected 
component, crisis-related. Assume that, ex ante, rates applied by banks to obligors are broadly consistent 
with Jarrow et al, 1997: 
 
* * *




reg is the rate applied to obligors which are expected to be regular at the end of the relevant horizon, 
and s
*
i >0 is the spread which accounts for the likelihood of risky debtors to shift to the i
th class of impair-
ment by the end of the period. Banks can not perfectly forecast the actual worsening of each obligor. There-
fore, averaging these ex ante rates according to the realised transitions, as in Table 2, what we expect to find 
is an ex post average of rates. If we assume there are two periods, a benchmark (bm) and a crisis (cr) period, 
then the average rates will be, in the benchmark period (tildes denote averages):
11 
 





, bm i u i reg bm i u reg b i w s r w r r − + + =        [ a 2 . a ]  
 
Where wu,i,bm is the share of unexpected impairments, i.e. obligors that we find in the i
th cell of impairment 
of the matrix, but were not detected as risky ex ante, and therefore were erroneously charged a rate r
*
reg 
(0≤wu,i,bm≤1). The complement (1 – wu,i,bm) is the share of expected, correctly priced impairments. By the 
same token, in the crisis period: 
 





, cr i u i reg cr i u reg c i w s r w r r − + + =         [ a 2 . b ]  
 
The two ex post spreads, with respect to the base-rates in [a1], will be: 
 









~ − + = − − + − + =    [a3.a] 









~ − + = − − + − + =    [a3.b] 
 
The difference between the ex post spreads in the two periods, s ~
i,cr – s ~
i,bm, will be: 
 
                                                 
11 Without loss of generality, I assume that there are just one class of impairment and the same ex ante rates in the two 
periods.   29
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, , cr i u bm i u i bm i u i i cr i u i i bm i cr i w w s w s s w s s s s − = + − − = −     [ a 4 ]  
 
We can define the additional unexpected share of impairments, due to the crisis, Δwu,i,cr, such that wu,i,cr = 
wu,i,bm + Δwu,i,cr. Then, the ex post spread in the ‘crisis’ matrix can be decomposed as follows: 
 
cr i u i bm i cr i u bm i u bm i u i bm i cr i u bm i u i bm i cr i w s s w w w s s w w s s s , ,
*
, , , , , , ,
*
, , , , ,
*
, ,
~ ) ( ~ ) ( ~ ~ Δ − = Δ − − + = − + = [a5] 
 
The [a5] states that the spread in the crisis matrix is given by the spread in the ‘benchmark’ matrix, minus 
an unexpected component, which is proportional to the additional surprises in impairments due to the crisis. 
If Δwu,i,cr>0 (i.e., there is a positive amount of surprises entirely due to the crisis), then the second compo-
nent will lessen the crisis-spread. 
4. Econometric analysis. Variables description 
Dependent variable: spread. – This is the difference between the short-term interest rate applied to any 
given bank-firm relationship in the sample, and the average interest rate applied at the same date to fully 
regular loans, which remained fully regular after 24 months, within the same region as the relevant firm. 
Transitions. – Dummy variables, = 1 if the bank-firm relationship has recorded the relevant shift among dif-
ferent credit impairments in the 24 months following the date the interest rate is recorded. Each dummy cor-
responds to a given cell of the transition matrix (49 dummies, e.g. ‘From fully regular to fully regular’, 
‘From fully regular to overdraft’, etc.). 
Credit initial situation. – Dummy variables, = 1 if the bank-firm relationship starts the reference period in a 
given state of impairment (7 dummies, ‘Fully regular’, ‘Overdraft’, ‘Past-due < 180 dd’, ‘Past-due > 180 
dd’, ‘Substandard’, ‘Non performing’, ‘Loss’). 
Crisis. Dummy variable, = 1 for period 2007-09 (interest rates recorded at end 2007, transitions recorded 
from end 2007 to end 2009). 
Top Five banking groups. – Dummy variable, =1 if the bank belongs to the biggest 5 Italian banking 
groups. 
Firm size. – Logarithm, or square, of the size of bank credit recorded in the Taxia dataset, proxied by the 
computational numbers for interest rates charged by all banks to the relevant firm at the relevant date. 
SMEs. – Dummy variable, =1 for firms with a workforce < 20 units. 
Collateral. – Dummy variables, =1 if the bank-firm relationship is assisted by collateral at the start or at the 
end of the relevant period (2 dummies). 
Firm’s credit history length. – Dummy variables, = 1 if the firm has been recorded for the first time into the 
Italian Credit Register in the relevant year (13 dummies, <1995, 1996 to 2007). 
Firm’s institutional sector. – Dummy variables, = 1 if the firm belongs to the relevant institutional sector 
(16 dummies, e.g: ‘operational firms’, ‘holdings’, ‘pool of firms’, etc.). 
Firm’s industry. – Dummy variables, = 1 if the firm operates into the relevant sector (192 dummies). 
Firm’s region. – Dummy variables, = 1 if the firm is located in the relevant Italian region (20 dummies). 
Firm’s incorporation technique. – Dummy variables, = 1 if the firm is incorporated according to the rele-
vant scheme (5 dummies, e.g. ‘limited company with equity capital’, ‘limited company’, etc.). 
Bank’s category. – Dummy variables, = 1 if the bank belongs to the relevant institutional-dimensional 
group (3 dummies, ‘Big, major and medium-sized banks’, ‘Small banks, not mutual (Bcc)’, ‘Small, mutual 
banks (Bcc)’). 
Banks using rating models, using rating model for pricing, with high delegation . – Dummy variables, = 1 if 
banks, according to the Banca d’Italia survey (Albareto et al, 2008), used rating models for firms in 2007, 
or used rating models for pricing, or had a above-the-median relative delegation to Loan Officer (amount of 
credit that the Loan Officer could grant to firms with respect to the amount of credit that the CEO could 
grant). 
Main bank. – Dummy variable, = 1 if the bank extended the major amount of credit to the relevant firm at 
the initial date of the relevant period.   30
Appendix 2: Tables and Figures 
 
Table a1 
Italian banking groups: Credit quality (1) 
(shares of total credit to customers; percentage values)  
ITEMS  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
      
  Total banking groups (2) 
Fully  regular  (a)  93.8 94.9 95.4 93.5 90.9 
Impaired  (b)  6.2 5.1 4.6 6.5 9.1 
- past-due and overdraft  0.7  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.8 
-  restructured  0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.6 
-  sub  standard  1.9 1.1 1.1 2.0 3.0 
-  non  performing  3.4 3.2 3.0 3.8 4.7 
      
Total credit to customers (a+b)  100  100  100  100  100 
   Major banking groups (3) 
Fully  regular  (a)  93.5 94.9 95.2 93.2 90.1 
Impaired  (b)  6.5 5.1 4.8 6.8 9.9 
- past-due and overdraft  0.7  0.4  0.3  0.5  0.7 
-  restructured  0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.7 
-  sub  standard  2.2 1.1 1.1 2.1 3.3 
-  non  performing  3.5 3.3 3.2 4.1 5.2 
      
Total credit to customers (a+b)  100  100  100  100  100 
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual report.  
(1) Data retrieved from supervisory statistical reports. They are not perfectly comparable to Credit Register (CR) data reported in other tables. – (2) 
Italian groups which are subsidiaries of foreign banks are included. – (3) Top five groups as regards total assets as at the end of the reference year. 
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Table a2 
Transition matrix (North-West) (1) 
(period 31 December 2007 – 2009 and 2005 – 2007; percentage frequencies)  
State of the loan at the final date of the reference period    State of the loan 
at the initial date 
of the reference 
period 
Fully 







forming  Loss  N. loans 
(000) 
           
  a. “Recession” matrix (December 2007  December 2009) 
Fully  regular  80.1  14.1 1.2 0.9 2.0  1.4  0.3  322.9 
Overdraft  43.6  36.0 3.2 2.5 7.6  6.0  1.1  87.0 
Past-due <180 dd  32.1  25.9  5.0  6.0  15.1  13.9  2.0  5.8 
Past-due  >180  dd 31.4 20.6  4.4 10.6 17.0  14.7 1.3  4.9 
Sub  standard  7.5 6.3 1.1 1.3  38.3 40.1  5.4 6.5 
Non-  performing  0.1      94.0  5.9  62.1 
Loss        14.0  86.0  15.1 
  b. “Expansion” matrix (December 2005  December 2007) 
Fully  regular  82.1  14.6 0.9 0.8 0.7  0.7  0.1  295.6 
Overdraft  48.3  38.8 2.6 2.4 3.3  3.7  0.9  78.6 
Past-due  <180  dd  36.1  33.0 5.0 6.5 8.0  9.6  1.7 5.8 
Past-due  >180  dd 32.6 26.8  4.6 11.2 10.5  12.6 1.7  6.4 
Sub  standard  8.3 8.5 0.9 1.3  27.5 44.0  9.5 5.4 
Non-  performing        90.7  9.1  62.6 
Loss        1.7  98.3  12.6 
Source: Central Credit Register. See methodological appendix. 
(1) Entries in the matrix represent the percentage frequencies at which bank-firm relationships, recorded in the state shown in the first column at the 
start of the reference period, moved towards the situation shown in the subsequent columns at the end of the following 24 months. Frequencies are 
reported as percentage of the number of the bank-firm relationships in the sample belonging to the relevant initial state; they sum up to 1 by row. Val-
ues below 0,1 are not reported. 
 
Table a3 
Transition matrix (North-East) (1) 
(period 31 December 2007 – 2009 and 2005 – 2007; percentage frequencies)  
State of the loan at the final date of the reference period    State of the loan 
at the initial date 
of the reference 
period 
Fully 







forming  Loss  N. loans 
(000) 
           
  a. “Recession” matrix (December 2007  December 2009) 
Fully  regular  81.7  12.8 1.2 0.9 1.7  1.3  0.3  294.5 
Overdraft  46.1  33.7 3.2 2.7 7.3  5.9  1.1  75.1 
Past-due <180 dd  34.9  24.7  5.9  6.1  14.9  12.1  1.4  5.7 
Past-due  >180  dd 32.0 19.0  4.6 10.1 18.3  14.9 1.1  4.6 
Sub  standard  1 8.2 1.4 1.5  39.3 35.1  4.6 6.5 
Non-  performing  0.1  0.1    0.1  94.5  5.3  40.9 
Loss        6.5  93.5  13.0 
  b. “Expansion” matrix (December 2005  December 2007) 
Fully  regular  82.2  14.4 1.0 0.8 0.7  0.7  0.2  264.5 
Overdraft  47.4  38.8 2.9 2.5 3.8  3.8  0.8  68.1 
Past-due  <180  dd  36.1  32.6 5.5 6.9 9.1  8.4  1.5 5.5 
Past-due  >180  dd 31.1 27.2  5.0 11.9 12.2  10.8 1.8  5.4 
Sub  standard  10.3  10.5 1.5 1.5  33.9 35.1  7.0 5.7 
Non-  performing        84.4  15.5  40.3 
Loss        1.1  98.8  10.1 
Source: Central Credit Register. See methodological appendix. 
(1) Entries in the matrix represent the percentage frequencies at which bank-firm relationships, recorded in the state shown in the first column at the 
start of the reference period, moved towards the situation shown in the subsequent columns at the end of the following 24 months. Frequencies are 
reported as percentage of the number of the bank-firm relationships in the sample belonging to the relevant initial state; they sum up to 1 by row. Val-
ues below 0,1 are not reported. 
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Table a4 
Transition matrix (Center) (1) 
(period 31 December 2007 – 2009 and 2005 – 2007; percentage frequencies)  
State of the loan at the final date of the reference period    State of the loan 
at the initial date 
of the reference 
period 
Fully 







forming  Loss  N. loans 
(000) 
           
  a. “Recession” matrix (December 2007  December 2009) 
Fully  regular  77.1  15.6 1.7 1.7 2.2  1.5  0.2  196.3 
Overdraft  40.6  36.3 3.8 4.4 8.1  6.1  0.8  61.6 
Past-due <180 dd  32.0  25.7  6.7  8.1  15.6  10.7  1.1  5.1 
Past-due >180 dd  28.3  20.9  4.3  12.7  2  12.8  1.1  5.3 
Sub  standard  6.6 6.9 1.3 2.0  42.6 36.5  4.2 5.9 
Non-  performing  0.1     0.1  93.7  6.1  57.1 
Loss        9.6  90.4  26.2 
  b. “Expansion” matrix (December 2005  December 2007) 
Fully  regular  79.4  16.2 1.3 1.3 0.9  0.8  0.1  161.0 
Overdraft  47.2  38.1 3.0 3.2 3.7  3.9  0.8  61.6 
Past-due  <180  dd  35.5  32.4 5.9 8.9 7.5  8.1  1.8 5.6 
Past-due  >180  dd 29.7 25.4  5.4 13.4 12.4  11.1 2.6  7.4 
Sub  standard  7.2 7.0 1.3 1.9  33.4 39.5  9.7 5.9 
Non-  performing        83.0  17.0  62.5 
Loss        0.6  99.4  25.6 
Source: Central Credit Register. See methodological appendix. 
(1) Entries in the matrix represent the percentage frequencies at which bank-firm relationships, recorded in the state shown in the first column at the 
start of the reference period, moved towards the situation shown in the subsequent columns at the end of the following 24 months. Frequencies are 
reported as percentage of the number of the bank-firm relationships in the sample belonging to the relevant initial state; they sum up to 1 by row. Val-
ues below 0,1 are not reported. 
 
Table a5 
Transition matrix (South) (1) 
(period 31 December 2007 – 2009 and 2005 – 2007; percentage frequencies)  
State of the loan at the final date of the reference period    State of the loan 
at the initial date 
of the reference 
period 
Fully 







forming  Loss  N. loans 
(000) 
           
  a. “Recession” matrix (December 2007  December 2009) 
Fully  regular  77.0  15.3 1.6 1.7 2.8  1.4  0.1  148.7 
Overdraft  40.4  35.4 3.5 4.3 9.7  6.2  0.6  43.7 
Past-due <180 dd  31.5  23.0  5.6  7.1  19.2  12.7  1.0  4.0 
Past-due >180 dd  29.1  18.3  3.6  1  22.8  14.5  1.6  4.8 
Sub  standard  5.3 4.4 1.1 1.6  45.8 38.4  3.3 5.6 
Non-  performing        95.9  4.0  95.9 
Loss        10.9  89.0  27.8 
  b. “Expansion” matrix (December 2005  December 2007) 
Fully  regular  78.3  16.3 1.4 1.7 1.2  1.0  0.1  126.3 
Overdraft  43.3  38.4 3.1 4.2 5.0  5.3  0.7  41.3 
Past-due <180 dd  33.7  26.6  6.4  8.9  10.8  12.0  1.5  4.0 
Past-due  >180  dd 28.9 21.1  3.5 12.6 14.9  16.4 2.5  5.6 
Sub  standard  6.7 5.7 1.1 2.2  31.4 45.6  7.4 5.6 
Non-  performing        91.0  8.9  106.5 
Loss        0.9  99.0  26.3 
Source: Central Credit Register. See methodological appendix. 
(1) Entries in the matrix represent the percentage frequencies at which bank-firm relationships, recorded in the state shown in the first column at the 
start of the reference period, moved towards the situation shown in the subsequent columns at the end of the following 24 months. Frequencies are 
reported as percentage of the number of the bank-firm relationships in the sample belonging to the relevant initial state; they sum up to 1 by row. Val-
ues below 0,1 are not reported. 
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Table a6 
Transition matrix (Credit amounts) (1) 
(period 31 December 2007 – 2009 and 2005 – 2007; percentage frequencies)  
State of the loan at the final date of the reference period    State of the loan 
at the initial date 
of the reference 
period 
Fully 











           
  a. “Recession” matrix (December 2007  December 2009) 
Fully  regular  89.3 1.1 1.6 1.8 3.9  2.0  0.4  610,629.6 
Overdraft  78.6 4.0 1.9 2.1 6.5  4.1  2.8  6,027.6 
Past-due <180 dd  57.8  1.1  5.4  5.8  16.7  12.4  0.7  7,342.3 
Past-due >180 dd  55.8  0.6  2.7  9.1  19.4  11.8  0.6  7,702.3 
Sub  standard  14.1 0.3 0.8 1.2  40.7 39.2  3.7  9,571.5 
Non-  performing  0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 93.8  5.8  17,935.2 
Loss  0.3 0.0     1.4  3.6  94.7  4,248.1 
  b. “Expansion” matrix (December 2005  December 2007) 
Fully  regular  93.7 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4  1.0  0.2  492,580.3 
Overdraft  83.2 7.3 1.3 2.0 2.7  2.9  0.5  5,953.6 
Past-due  <180  dd  70.7 1.1 5.3 7.3 7.9  6.9  0.8  7,396.7 
Past-due >180 dd  61.3  1.0  3.8  12.3  12.5  8.7  0.5  10,036.6 
Sub  standard  16.4 0.3 1.0 1.6  40.0 36.0  4.7  9,319.1 
Non-  performing  0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 92.1  7.2  19,161.7 
Loss  0.4 0.0   0.0 0.0  8.6  90.9  8,222.2 
Source: Central Credit Register. See methodological appendix. 
(1) Entries in the matrix represent the percentage frequencies at which the credit amounts referred to each bank-firm relationship, recorded in the state 
shown in the first column at the start of the reference period, moved towards the situation shown in the subsequent columns at the end of the following 
24 months. Frequencies are reported as percentage of the number of the bank-firm relationships in the sample belonging to the relevant initial state; 
they sum up to 1 by row. Values below 0,1 are not reported. 
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Table a7 
The impact of the crisis on credit risk pricing (1) 
dependent variable: interest rate spread towards regular loans at both the start and the end of the relevant period 
  [1] Before the crisis (2005-07)  [2] During the crisis (2007-09) 
Transitions: (2)  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1. from regular loans    0.66 0.82 0.95 1.59 1.72 1.67   0.67 0.85 1.06 1.37 1.53 1.51
2. from overdraft  0.35 0.88 1.01 1.16 1.68 1.85 1.93 -1.53 -0.99 -0.82 -0.70 -0.38 -0.17  
3. from past-due <180dd  -0.71  -0.12   -0.02 0.64 0.79 0.84 -1.57 -1.10 -1.06 -0.93 -0.48 -0.28  
4. from past-due >180dd  -0.57  0.01   0.07 0.84 1.07 1.34 -0.73 -0.24   -0.09  0.46 0.68 0.95
5. from substandard  -0.39  -0.03 -0.08   -0.18 0.19 0.24 -0.39 -0.09   0.04 -0.15 0.21 0.32
6. from non performing         0.66       5.73  
        
Credit initial situation:       
2. overdraft  0.591    2.482  *** 
3. past-due <180dd  1.883  ***  2.820  *** 
4. past-due >180dd  1.850  ***  1.961  *** 
5. substandard  2.523  ***  2.408  *** 
6. non performing  1.954  ***   
      
Top five banking groups  0.411 -1.353  *** 
Firm size (log)  -0.192  ***  -0.055  *** 
Firm size (squared)  -0.002  ***  -0.008  *** 
Non-SMEs  0.084    0.103   
Collateral - start period  -0.047  ***  -0.020   
                - end period  -0.063  ***  -0.043  *** 
    
        
Firm credit history length  Y  Y   
Firm institutional sector  Y  Y   
Firm industry  Y  Y   
Firm region  Y  Y   
Firm incorporation technique  Y  Y   
Bank’s category  Y  Y   
Bank’s fixed effects  Y  Y   
    
Constant 6.533  ***  4.499  *** 
    
N. observations  596,717  682,246   
Adj. R-squared  0.29  0.27 
    
Source: estimation of regressions based on equation [1] in the text. 
 (1) * = significant at 10 percent; ** = significant at 5 percent; *** = significant at 1 percent. Missing values mean that the estimation is not possible for the relevant 
parameter. Interest rates outside 1st or 99th percentile are dropped. – (2) The reported coefficients refer to the spread of loans shifting from situation in the first col-
umn to situations in the subsequent columns, labelled as follows: 1. regular 2. overdraft, 3. past-due <180 dd, 4. past-due >180 dd, 5. substandard, 6. non perform-
ing, 7. loss. Figures in bold denote parameters statistically significant at least at 1 or 5 per cent level. 
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Table a8 
The impact of the crisis on credit risk pricing: top five groups (1) 
dependent variable: interest rate spread towards regular loans at both the start and the end of the relevant period 
Transitions, basis spread: (2)  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1. from regular loans    0.67 0.82 0.99 1.43 1.56 1.44
2. from overdraft  -1.47 -0.94 -0.79 -0.66 -0.23 -0.05
3. from past-due <180dd  -0.58  -0.06 0.05 0.61 0.81 0.88
4. from past-due >180dd  0.73  1.28 1.33 1.32 2.01  2.21 2.53
5. from substandard  1.40  1.81 1.85 1.92 1.70  2.01 2.00
6. from non performing      0.23
    
Unexpected worsening for top five groups: (2) (3)   
1. from regular loans    0.04 0.07 0.19 -0.03 0.08 0.40
2. from overdraft  -0.04 0.06 0.08 0.22 -0.10  -0.04 0.30
3. from past-due <180dd  -0.09  0.00 0.24 0.21 -0.03  -0.05 0.47
4. from past-due >180dd  -0.05  -0.06 0.22 0.41 -0.06 0.03 0.06
5. from substandard  -0.01  -0.33 -0.45 -0.54 -0.32 -0.17 0.29
6. from non performing     3.49
           
Credit initial situation:            
2. overdraft  2.42  ***       
3. past-due <180dd  1.79  ***       
4. past-due >180dd  0.54         
5. substandard  0.67         
6. non performing  2.20  ***        
       
Top five banking groups  0.396  ***      
Crisis -0.133  ***      
Top five banking groups * Crisis  -0.658  ***      
Firm size (log)  -0.127  ***      
Firm size (squared)  -0.005  ***      
Non-SMEs 0.162  ***      
Non-SMEs * Crisis  -0.052  ***      
Collateral - start period  -0.039  ***      
                - end period  -0.038  ***      
         
Firm credit history length  Y         
Firm institutional sector  Y         
Firm  industry  Y       
Firm region  Y         
Firm incorporation technique  Y         
Bank’s  category  Y       
Bank’s fixed effects  Y         
        
Constant 5.598  ***      
        
N. observations  1,278,963         
Adj. R-squared  0.27       
      
Source: estimation of regressions based on equation [1] in the text. 
 (1) * = significant at 10 percent; ** = significant at 5 percent; *** = significant at 1 percent. Missing values mean that the estimation is not possible for the relevant 
parameter. Interest rates outside 1st or 99th percentile are dropped. – (2) The reported coefficients refer to the spread of loans shifting from situation in the first col-
umn to situations in the subsequent columns, labelled as follows: 1. regular 2. overdraft, 3. past-due <180 dd, 4. past-due >180 dd, 5. substandard, 6. non perform-
ing, 7. loss. Figures in bold denote parameters statistically significant at least at 1 or 5 per cent level. – (3) The coefficients estimate the interaction of the transition 
dummies * top five groups * Crisis, and gauge the differential unexpected component of the credit worsening, as reflected in credit risk pricing efficiency, for top five 
groups.   36
Table a9  
The impact of the crisis on credit risk pricing: beyond the size-effect (1) 
dependent variable: interest rate spread towards regular loans at both the start and the end of the relevant period 
  [1]  
Use of rating  
[2]  
Use rating for pricing 
[3] 
Delegation to l.officer 
[4] 
Main bank 
Credit transitions  Y    Y   Y   Y  
Transitions*Bank feature*Crisis  Y    Y   Y   Y  
          
Credit initial situation:           
2. overdraft  2.490  ***  2.515 ***  1.845 ***  2.476 *** 
3. past-due <180dd  1.894  ***  1.834 ***  2.800 ***  1.882 *** 
4. past-due >180dd  0.523    0.519   3.086 ***  0.532  
5. substandard  0.894    0.858   2.495 ***  0.891  
6. non performing  2.212  ***  2.190 ***  4.001 ***  3.949 *** 
        
Top five banking groups  0.406  ***  0.368 ***  0.394 ***  0.389 *** 
Crisis -0.221  ***  -0.151 ***  -0.067 ***  -0.203 *** 
Top five banking groups * Crisis  -0.667  ***  -0.647 ***  -0.733 ***  -0.637 *** 
        
Use of rating models  0.015         
Use of rating models * Crisis  0.111  ***       
Use of ratings for pricing      0.002    
Use of ratings for pricing *Crisis      0.188 ***    
High delegation to Loan Officer       -0.351    
High delegation to L.O. * Crisis       0.058 ***   
Main bank         -0.491 *** 
Main bank * Crisis         0.079 *** 
        
Firm size (log)  -0.127  ***  -0.127 ***  -0.110 ***  -0.071 *** 
Firm size (squared)  -0.005  ***  -0.005 ***  -0.006 ***  -0.008 *** 
Non-SMEs 0.162  **  0.162 **  0.117 *  0.129 ** 
Non-SMEs * Crisis  -0.051  ***  -0.056 ***  -0.054 ***  -0.022 *** 
Collateral - start period  -0.039  ***  -0.040 ***  -0.034 **  -0.028 ** 
                - end period  -0.038  ***  -0.037 ***  -0.049 ***  -0.032 ** 
       
        
Firm credit history length  Y    Y   Y   Y  
Firm institutional sector  Y    Y   Y   Y  
Firm industry  Y    Y   Y   Y  
Firm region  Y    Y   Y   Y  
Firm incorporation technique  Y    Y   Y   Y  
Bank’s category  Y    Y   Y   Y  
Bank’s fixed effects  Y    Y   Y   Y  
        
Constant 5.579  ***  5.607 ***  4.755   5.738 *** 
        
N. observations  1,278,963    1,278,963   1,111,357   1,278,963  
Adj. R-squared  0.27    0.27   0.27   0.27  
      
Source: estimation of regressions based on equation [1] in the text. 
 (1) * = significant at 10 percent; ** = significant at 5 percent; *** = significant at 1 percent. Missing values mean that the estimation is not possible for the relevant 
parameter. Interest rates outside 1st or 99th percentile are dropped.    37
Table a10 
The impact of the crisis on credit risk pricing: Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and non-SMEs (1) 
dependent variable: interest rate spread towards regular loans at both the start and the end of the relevant period 
  [1] Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)  [2] Non-Small and Medium Enterprises 
Transitions: (2)  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1. from regular loans   0.69 0.90 1.10 1.53 1.63 1.54 0.66 0.78 0.91 1.37 1.51 1.41
2. from overdraft  -1.27 -0.75 -0.59 -0.45 -0.06 0.04 0.06 0.61 0.73 0.85 1.32 1.53 1.57
3. from past-due <180dd  -1.38 -0.93 -0.92 -0.89 -0.47 -0.33 -1.58 -1.01 -0.87 -0.83 -0.12 0.08
4. from past-due >180dd  -1.84 -1.33 -1.24 -1.26 -0.74 -0.70 -1.81 -1.24 -1.24 -1.25 -0.38 -0.02
5. from substandard  -0.50  -0.21 -0.16 -0.21 -0.02 -0.10 -0.83 -0.26 -0.53   -0.52 -0.09 -0.13
6. from non performing      2.40       2.05
        
Unexpected worsening for top five groups: (2) (3)   
1. from regular loans    0.02  -0.04 0.21 -0.15 0.12 0.81 0.05  0.12  0.20  0.03 0.10 0.36
2. from overdraft  0.03  0.02  0.10 0.15 -0.20 0.03 0.48 -0.07 0.08  0.07  0.27  -0.05 -0.07 0.25
3. from past-due <180dd  -0.04  -0.06  0.16 0.49 -0.08 0.00 0.16 -0.10 0.04 0.24 0.02  -0.04 -0.12 0.51
4. from past-due >180dd  0.06  -0.11  0.03 0.47 -0.19 0.06 -0.66 -0.14 -0.06 0.33 0.30 0.00 -0.07 0.20
5. from substandard  -0.31  -0.43 -0.89 -0.25 -0.49 -0.40 0.44 0.31 -0.24 0.19  -1.02  -0.21 -0.05 0.25
6. from non performing            3.60
    
Credit initial situation:     
2. overdraft  2.275  ***  0.854   
3. past-due <180dd  2.794  ***  2.646  *** 
4. past-due >180dd  3.310  ***  2.953  *** 
5. substandard  2.666  ***  2.829  *** 
6. non performing        
        
Top five banking groups  0.349  ***  0.414  *** 
Crisis  -0.157  ***  -0.169  *** 
Top five banking groups*Crisis  -0.589  ***  -0.693  *** 
Firm size (log)  -0.077  ***  0.001   
Firm size (squared)  -0.009  ***  -0.009  *** 
Collateral - start period  -0.009    -0.066   
                - end period  -0.052  ***  -0.017 *** 
        
Firm credit history length  Y    Y   
Firm institutional sector  Y    Y   
Firm industry  Y    Y   
Firm region  Y    Y   
Firm incorporation technique  Y    Y   
Bank’s category  Y    Y   
Bank’s fixed effects  Y    Y   
        
Constant 5.273  ***  3.232  **** 
        
N. observations  495,523    783,440   
Adj. R-squared  0.30    0.25   
      
Source: estimation of regressions based on equation [1] in the text. 
 (1) * = significant at 10 percent; ** = significant at 5 percent; *** = significant at 1 percent. Missing values mean that the estimation is not possible for the relevant 
parameter. Interest rates outside 1st or 99th percentile are dropped. – (2) The reported coefficients refer to the spread of loans shifting from situation in the first col-
umn to situations in the subsequent columns, labelled as follows: 1. regular 2. overdraft, 3. past-due <180 dd, 4. past-due >180 dd, 5. substandard, 6. non perform-
ing, 7. loss. Figures in bold denote parameters statistically significant at least at 1 or 5 per cent level l. – (3) The coefficients estimate the interaction of the transition 
dummies * banks within the top five groups * Crisis, and gauge the differential unexpected component of the credit worsening, as reflected in credit risk pricing effi-
ciency, for banks within the top five groups. 
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Table a11 
The impact of the crisis on credit risk pricing: regional effects (1) 
dependent variable: interest rate spread towards regular loans at both the start and the end of the relevant period 
  (a) Overall effects   (b) Regional effects 
Transitions, basis spread: (2)  1.  2.  3. 4. 5. 6. 7.   Basis values  Crisis change
1. from regular loans   0.68 0.83 1.02 1.41 1.60 1.59     
2. from overdraft  -1.58 -1.02 -0.88 -0.73 -0.37 -0.15 - Piemonte  (Base)  (Base) 
3. from past-due <180dd  -0.63  -0.09 0.03 0.55 0.77 0.97 - Valle d’Aosta  -1,291  ***  -0,215 ** 
4. from past-due >180dd  0.77 1.33 1.40 1.42 2.03 2.26 2.64 - Lombardia  -0,579  ***  0,024  
5. from substandard  1.47  1.83  1.82 1.93 1.67 2.06 2.17 - Liguria  0,469  ***  -0,187 *** 
6. from non performing      -1.58 - Trentino-AA  0,569  ***  -0,305 *** 
     - Veneto  0,287  ***  -0,123 *** 
Credit initial situation:      - Friuli VG  0.205  ***  0.042  
2. overdraft  2.520  ***  - Emilia-R  -0.337  ***  0.097 *** 
3. past-due <180dd  1.835  ***  - Toscana  -0.307  ***  0.125 *** 
4. past-due >180dd  0.512  ***  - Umbria  -0.630  ***  0.417 *** 
5. substandard  0.605    - Marche  -0.620  ***  0.180 *** 
6. non performing  3.847  ***  - Lazio  0.233  ***  -0.074 *** 
    - Abruzzo  -0.833  ***  0.375 *** 
Top five banking groups  -0.018  *  - Molise  -0.549  ***  0.399 *** 
Crisis  -0.400  ***  - Campania  -0.576  ***  0.245 *** 
Firm size (log)  -0.130  ***  - Puglia   -1.076  ***  0.569 *** 
Firm size (squared)  -0.005  ***  - Basilicata  -0.085    -0.025  
Non-SMEs  0.162  **  - Calabria  -1.067  ***  0.690 *** 
Non-SMEs * Crisis  -0.061  ***  - Sicilia  -0.622  ***  0.142 *** 
Collateral - start period  -0.040  ***  - Sardegna  -0.865  ***  0.736 *** 
                - end period  -0.039  ***      
          
         
Firm credit history length  Y        
Firm institutional sector  Y        
Firm industry  Y        
Firm region  Y  (see panel (b) )      
Firm incorporation technique  Y        
Bank’s category  Y        
Bank’s fixed effects  Y         
         
Constant 5.678  ***      
        
N. observations  1,278,963         
Adj. R-squared  0.27       
      
Source: estimation of regressions based on equation [1] in the text. 
 (1) * = significant at 10 percent; ** = significant at 5 percent; *** = significant at 1 percent. Missing values mean that the estimation is not possible for the relevant 
parameter. Interest rates outside 1st or 99th percentile are dropped. – (2) The reported coefficients refer to the spread of loans shifting from situation in the first col-
umn to situations in the subsequent columns, labelled as follows: 1. regular 2. overdraft, 3. past-due <180 dd, 4. past-due >180 dd, 5. substandard, 6. non perform-
ing, 7. loss. Figures in bold denote parameters statistically significant at least at 1 or 5 per cent level. 
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Table a12 
The impact of the crisis on credit risk pricing: robustness checks (1) 
dependent variable: interest rate or spread towards regular loans at both the start and the end of the relevant period 
  Robustness check (a)  Robustness check (b) Robustness check (c)  Robustness check (d)
Credit transitions  Y    Y   Y   Y  
Credit transitions*Topfive*Crisis  Y    Y   Y   Y  
          
Credit initial situation:           
2. overdraft  2.417  ***  2.543 *** 2.424 *** 0.771 *** 
3. past-due <180dd  1.790  ***  1.874 *** 1.807 *** 2.415 *** 
4. past-due >180dd  0.539    0.489  0.621  1.678 *** 
5. substandard  0.706  ***  0.766 *** 0.763 *** 2.316 *** 
6. non performing  2.204  ***  1.178 *** 2.191 *** 1.839 *** 
        
Top five banking groups  0.407  ***  0.752 *** 0.403 *** 0.098 *** 
Crisis -0.125  ***  -0.293 *** 1.043 ***  -0.499 *** 
Top five banking groups*Crisis  -0.667  ***  -0.194 *** -0.717 *** -0.338 *** 
Firm size (log)  -0.127  ***  -0.128 *** -0.129 *** -0.120 *** 
Firm size (squared)  -0.005  ***  -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.004 *** 
Non-SMEs 0.162  ***  0.265 *** 0.176 *** 0.179 *** 
Non-SMEs * Crisis  -0.052  ***  -0.100 *** -0.074 *** -0.125 *** 
Collateral - start period  -0.039  ***  -0.043 *** -0.042 *** -0.027 ** 
                - end period  -0.038  ***  -0.047 ***  -0.037 *** -0.052 *** 
       
        
Firm credit history length  Y    Y   Y   Y  
Firm institutional sector  Y    Y   Y   Y  
Firm industry  Y    Y   Y   Y  
Firm region  Y    Y   Y   Y  
Firm incorporation technique  Y    Y   Y   Y  
Bank’s category  NO    NO   Y   Y  
Bank’s fixed effects  Y    NO   Y   Y  
        
Constant 5.589  ***  4.595 ***  11.713 *** 5.571 *** 
        
N. observations  1,278,963    1,278,963   1,278,963   1,186,593  
Adj. R-squared  0.27    0.21   0.24   0.26  
      
Source: estimation of regressions based on equation [1] in the text. 
 (1) * = significant at 10 percent; ** = significant at 5 percent; *** = significant at 1 percent. Missing values mean that the estimation is not possible for the relevant 
parameter. Each column refers to a different modification of the baseline specification in equation [1]: Column (a) = bank’s category excluded; (b) = bank’s category 
excluded and non fixed effect for banks; (c) dependent variable = interest rates, not spread towards the benchmark case (i.e. the average rate to firms whose loans 
were in regular situations both at the start and at the end of the relevant period; (d) = excluded outlier observations with spreads beyond 5
th and 95
th percentile. Esti-
mates for coefficient of the transition matrices and the same coefficients interacted with the crisis variable are omitted. 
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Table a12 (continued) 
The impact of the crisis on credit risk pricing: robustness checks (1) 
dependent variable: interest rate or spread towards regular loans at both the start and the end of the relevant period 
  Robustness check (e)  Robustness check (f)     
Credit transitions  Y    Y      
Credit transitions*Topfive*Crisis  Y    Y      
          
Credit initial situation:           
2. overdraft  1.405  ***  0.484 ***    
3. past-due <180dd  -0.331    0.456 ***    
4. past-due >180dd  1.156  ***  0.597 ***    
5. substandard  1.994  ***  0.192 ***    
6. non performing  1.241    -0.121    
        
Top five banking groups  -0.599  ***  0.421 ***    
Crisis -0.017  **  -0.217 ***    
Top five banking groups*Crisis  -0.337  ***  -0.655 ***    
Firm size (log)  0.299  ***  -0.027 ***    
Firm size (squared)  -0.013  ***  -0.010 ***    
Non-SMEs 0.046    0.124 *    
Non-SMEs * Crisis  0.005    -0.026 ***    
Collateral - start period  -0.065  ***  -0.032 ***    
                - end period  N    -0.038 ***    
       
        
Firm credit history length  Y    Y    
Firm institutional sector  Y    Y    
Firm industry  Y    Y    
Firm region  Y    Y    
Firm incorporation technique  Y    Y    
Bank’s category  Y    Y   
Bank’s fixed effects  Y    Y      
        
Constant  0.342    5.184 ***    
        
N. observations  1,161,899    1,278,963      
Adj. R-squared  0.16    0.28      
      
Source: estimation of regressions based on equation [1] in the text. 
 (1) * = significant at 10 percent; ** = significant at 5 percent; *** = significant at 1 percent. Missing values mean that the estimation is not possible for the relevant 
parameter. Each column refers to a different modification of the baseline specification in equation [1]: Column (e) = impairment situations for each bank-firm relation-
ship are defined according to the quantities of credit in each situation at the reference date (see Appendix 1, Data and methodology). Reference period are Dec 
2005-Jun 2008 (non-crisis), Jun 2008-Dec 2010 (crisis). (f) = the impairment situation is defined having regard to the worst recorded classification of the debtor in the 
CR database at the reference date, regardless of which bank had provided the worst classification. 
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Figure a1 
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Source: Central Credit Register. See the methodological appendix. 
(1) Euclidean distance L
2 between two matrices Pa and Pb is the square of the sum of the quadratic differences between each entry in matrix Pa and the 
corresponding entry in Pb, divided by N
2 (Jafry and Schuermann, 2004). Apart from bank size, banks are classified according to a survey run by the Bank 
of Italy at 2007 and 2010.  
 
Figure a2 
Interest rate spread with respect to evolution of credit quality, before and after crisis (1) 
(percentage values)  
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Source: Central Credit Register. See methodological appendix. 
(1) Spread between (a) average interest rates at end of year (2005, 2007) on fully regular loans to firms that would have moved towards the state reported 
on the legend in the subsequent 24 months, and (b) average interest rates at the same time on loans that, starting from the situation reported on x-axis,  
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Figure a3 
Unexpected component in interest rates during the crisis (1) 
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(b) Unexpected
component
(c) Crisis spread (= (a) - (b), 2007-09 )
 
Source: Central Credit Register. See methodological appendix. 
(1) The benchmark component is the spread, recorded at end 2005, between (a) average rates required to “fully regular” obligors which would have 
turned substandard or non-performing within the following 24 months, and (b) average rates required to “fully regular” obligors which would have stayed 
regular within the following 24 months. The Crisis spread is the same spread computed at end 2007. The unexpected component is the difference be-
tween the two spreads. 
 
Figure a4 
Unexpected component in interest rates during the crisis, for banks using ratings or not (1) 
 (percentage points)  
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(a)  Benchmark component
(spread before crisis, 2005-07)
(b) Unexpected component (c) Crisis spread (= (a) - (b), 2007-09 )
 
Source: Central Credit Register. See methodological appendix. 
(1) The benchmark component is the spread, recorded at end 2005, between (a) average rates required to “fully regular” obligors which would have 
turned substandard or non-performing within the following 24 months, and (b) average rates required to “fully regular” obligors which would have stayed 
regular within the following 24 months. The Crisis spread is the same spread computed at end 2007. The unexpected component is the difference be-
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